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Abstract
We study optimal punishment in an all-pay contest with endogenous entry, where
the participant with the lowest performance may be punished. When a small punish-
ment is introduced, the lowest ability players drop out and those of medium ability
exert less e¤ort, while only the highest ability players exert more e¤ort. A su¢ cient
condition is given for the optimal punishment to be zero if the objective is to max-
imize the expected total e¤ort. As cost functions become more convex, punishment
becomes less desirable. When the objective is to maximize the expected highest indi-
vidual e¤ort, a positive punishment is desirable under much weaker conditions. (JEL
C72, D72, D82)
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1 Introduction
In daily life, carrots and sticks refers to a policy of o¤ering a combination of
rewards and punishments to induce some desired behavior. In the literature on
contests, focus has been on the carrots (allocating prizes to the top players), with
little attention paid to the sticks (punishing the bottom players). A possible reason
why punishments have received little theoretical attention is that if players have
to participate in a contest then it is trivial that introducing a punishment will be
e¤ective in increasing e¤ort. That is, for a given group of players who have to
participate, punishing the player who exerts the lowest e¤ort level will increase the
total e¤ort for sure. In fact, punishments should be made as large as possible in order
to maximize e¤ort. However, adding a punishment, especially when the punishment
is large, may violate individual rationality constraints, i.e., a player can nd that
his expected utility in equilibrium is below his outside option.
In this paper we assume that potential players observe the reward/punishment
scheme before deciding whether or not to participate in a contest. We call this type
of contest an open contest and consider whether punishments are desirable in this
context. For example, a profession in which low performers lose their jobs which
can be regarded as a punishment may discourage entry; is it the case that this
in turn may lead to less competition among those who do enter, and so negate the
positive e¤ect on e¤ort of a punishment mentioned above? Should essay contests
announce only the winners, or should they announce the entire ranking, subjecting
the worst performers to potential humiliation? Should promotion contests where
employees can choose whether or not to participate only announce the winner, or
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would it lead to a better top candidate if the bottom candidates were penalized in
some way?
To make progress on this sort of question, we analyze whether punishments are a
useful incentive mechanism for increasing e¤ort in an open, perfectly discriminating
contest (where e¤orts exerted are perfectly observable to the contest designer), where
players di¤er by ability (cost of e¤ort), which is private information. We assume
that there is a xed prize for the highest e¤ort, but that the contest designer can
choose to impose a punishment on the lowest performer. The punishment neither
consumes resources nor yields resources to the designer. We build on the seminal
model of Moldovanu and Sela (2001) which explains prize structures in contests
within the framework of private value all-pay auctions.
Our results can be summarized as follows. If the contest designer wants to
maximize the total e¤ort from all potential players, the optimal punishment will be
zero for a wide class of cases (a positive optimal punishment can only occur when
high ability players are relatively probable). As cost functions become more convex,
starting from linear costs, the optimal punishment decreases, i.e., punishment be-
comes less desirable. If the contest designer seeks only to maximize the e¤ort of the
top player, a strictly positive punishment should be set under weaker conditions,
and certainly if there are a su¢ cient number of players.
Our work is closely related to Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010), who also look
at punishments in perfectly discriminating contests. In one section of their paper, a
model in which players can choose whether or not to participate is also analyzed.1
1Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010) also consider a range of other scenarios, starting with situations
where punishments can only be administered at a cost (subject to a xed budget), and where
players have to participate. If only punishments can be administered, they establish under a
likelihood ratio condition that using all resources on a single punishment on the worst performer is
optimal. If both rewards and punishments are feasible, then resources may be expended on a single
2
Their result appears to contradict the corresponding result in our paper: In order
to maximize expected total e¤ort, they nd that a strictly positive punishment is
always optimal while we nd the optimal punishment is zero in a wide range of
cases.2 The reason for this di¤erence lies in the assumption about the support of
the distribution of the marginal cost of e¤ort. Our paper follows the assumptions
of Moldovanu and Sela (2001) in assuming that this distribution has positive and
bounded support. By contrast, in Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010) the inverse of the
marginal cost (denoted by a) is assumed to be distributed on the interval [0; 1], so the
marginal cost (i.e., 1=a) is distributed on the interval [1;+1). Our results show that
with a bounded support [s; s] (where s > s > 0), the desirability of a punishment
depends critically on the shape of the cost parameter distribution.3 In this respect,
our results can be seen as complementary to theirs, and we would argue that in
practice a bounded support is often realistic. For example, in contests involving
professionals, the support of the ability distribution is typically bounded due to
prior constraints on entry to the profession. Thus, in these situations, punishment
is likely to be undesirable. This seems to be more consistent with what we observe
in reality: explicit punishment is rarely used in open contests.
Intuitively, introducing a punishment has two e¤ects. Firstly, a selection e¤ect:
some players will drop out, and these will be those towards the bottom of the ability
range who are likely to lose anyway. This leads to the competition between the
actual participants becoming less erce since fewer players are involved. Those
prize/punishment depending on the distribution of abilities. Alternatively, if the size of punishment
is xed, and punishments are costless, they characterize the optimal number of punishments.
2See Proposition 3 and Example 1 for details.
3Replacing [s; s] with [1;+1), our model (with linear cost functions) would be exactly the
same as that in Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010). We conrm this equivalence in Section 3.1 below.
While Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010) focus on the case with linear cost functions, as already
mentioned with convex cost functions we nd that, in order to maximize expected total e¤ort,
punishment becomes less desirable when the cost function becomes more convex.
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who participate but are near the nonparticipation threshold will put in less e¤ort,
since they anticipate being beaten by higher ability players (at the threshold, e¤ort
must be zero). Secondly, there is an incentive e¤ect due to the desire to avoid
the punishment. The two e¤ects occur at the same time. We show that when a
su¢ ciently small punishment is introduced, the low ability players drop out and
the medium ability players exert less e¤ort, while only the high ability players exert
more e¤ort. This explains our contrasting results. When a punishment is introduced,
expected total e¤ort is likely to fall because of the loss of the lowest ability players
and the fact that the medium ability ones exert less e¤ort. On the other hand
because the highest ability players exert more e¤ort, the expected highest individual
e¤ort will increase for a wider range of ability distributions.
An entry fee (or minimum-e¤ort requirement) is in some respects similar to
a punishment in that it also excludes low-ability players from a contest. Higgins,
Shughart and Tollison (1985) study a contest where there is a xed entry cost
for everyone and contestants enter randomly in equilibrium. In an all-pay auction
model, Kaplan and Sela (2010) provide a rationale for entry fees in contests by
analyzing a two-stage model4 with privately known entry costs. Fu and Lu (2010)
investigate an imperfectly discriminating contest where the potential contestants
bear xed entry costs and the contest designer has a xed budget with two strategic
instruments: the prize purse and monetary transfers (subsidy/fee). Fu, Jiao and Lu
(2011) study imperfectly discriminating contests with endogenous and stochastic
entries.5 They show that the designer may benet from noisier contests and prefers
to invite only a subset of potential contestants to participate. Finally there has
4In the rst stage, potential players make entry decisions given entry costs being privately
known; in the second stage, participants make e¤orts (bids) after nding out who else has entered.
5Myerson and Warneryd (2006), Munster (2006), Lim and Matros (2009) and Fu, Jiao and Lu
(2010) also examine contests with stochastic participation.
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been some recent experimental work on the contest entry decision, although not
with explicit punishments, see Cason, Masters and Sherementa (2010) (where there
is a positive outside option which is lost upon entry, so this is similar to an entry
fee) and Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2010).
The di¤erence between an entry fee and a punishment should be emphasized.
First, with an entry fee, all participants have to su¤er some cost to enter the contest,
while in our model only the participant with the lowest e¤ort will be punished by
su¤ering a loss. Secondly, it has been proved that with linear cost functions, a contest
with a single rst prize and an (optimally set) entry fee is total e¤ort maximizing
among all feasible mechanisms that are incentive compatible and individual rational
(Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981), while in this paper, with no entry fee,
we show that for the same objective function, a punishment on the worst performer
is often not desirable.
In a seminal paper of a large literature on contests (or tournaments), Lazear and
Rosen (1981) argue that rank-order contests help to solve a moral hazard problem. In
a Lazear-Rosen contest, Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) discuss (among other matters)
how punishments can a¤ect the global incentive compatibility condition ensuring
that contestants are not better o¤choosing zero e¤ort over the e¤ort identied by the
usual marginal conditions. More recently, Gilpatric (2009) considers how the balance
of prizes and punishment a¤ect risk-taking in a Lazear-Rosen tournament, showing
that adding a punishment enables the contest designer to control contestantsincen-
tives to exert e¤ort and to alter output variance according to the designers aims.6
Akerlof and Holden (2010) extend Lazear and Rosens (1981) analysis to the case
6For example, as here, Gilpatric (2009) analyzes two possible aims of the contest organizer:
maximizing total e¤ort when she values all contestantse¤ort equally, or maximizing highest indi-
vidual e¤ort when she only values the highest of the contestantse¤orts.
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with multiple prizes and show that it is often optimal to give rewards that di¤er
between top performers by a smaller magnitude than the corresponding punish-
ments to poor performers. We stress that the context of the above papers is very
di¤erent from the one which we deal with: they focus on the symmetric case where
all players are homogeneous but e¤ort and performance is stochastically related,
whereas we look at a perfectly discriminating contest with endogenous entry where
heterogeneous contestants have private information on their abilities. In a setting
of perfectly discriminating contests (as in Moldovanu and Sela, 2001, and this pa-
per), Minor (2012) shows that with strictly convex costs, having an inverted reward
structure in which a larger prize goes to second place than to rst place may
be optimal as the less able are more incentivized. Likewise punishment, considered
here, leads to a steep reward structure and may create adverse incentives, the
more so as convexity of costs increase. In this sense, Minors results are consistent
with ours.
The contest literature has mostly focussed on the case of maximizing expected
total e¤ort. However in practice, the contest designer may not value all contestants
e¤orts equally, and may care more about the performance of the top (one or several)
contestants. Given this motivation, and as mentioned earlier, we also analyze what
the optimal punishment would be when the contest designer seeks to maximize the
expected highest individual e¤ort. For example, in the research contests studied by
Taylor (1995), the contest designer will only use the best submission from among all
contestants. In sporting competitions, the contest designer may be interested only
in the performance of the top player(s). Levitt (1995) argues that in many contexts
where multiple players are assigned to a task, only one of their outputs will be used:
This is especially true of creative endeavors such as the development of advertising
campaigns. Another example is suggested by Gilpatric (2009): If one considers
6
a group of junior faculty competing to win tenure, the department may value the
output of all contestants, but the output of the winners may be valued more than
that of the losers because the winners will be retained and their output will provide
greater ongoing reputation benets to the department.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, after setting up the
model formally with a linear cost function, we derive a symmetric equilibrium where
the e¤ort levels of participants in the contest are characterized by an equilibrium
e¤ort function. By analyzing this equilibrium e¤ort function, we elaborate on what
happens when a small or large punishment is introduced. In sections 3 and 4,
we discuss what the optimal punishment should be when maximizing the expected
total e¤ort and the expected highest individual e¤ort respectively. In addition, the
relationship of our work to that of Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010) is analyzed in
section 3.1. In section 5, we extend our previous analysis (with linear cost functions)
to the convex cost case. Concluding remarks are provided in section 6.
2 The Model
There are k  3 potential players in a perfectly discriminating contest with a xed7
prize V > 0. Assuming there is at least one participant, the player with the highest
e¤ort will win the prize, and the player with the lowest e¤ort will be punished by
bearing a loss P , 0  P  V , which is a choice variable of the contest designer. If
only one player participates in the contest, he receives the prize and the punishment
7We assume the prize is simply xed in value, and it is indivisible. While we do not show that
with divisibility it is still optimal to have a single prize, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) show that,
with linear and concave cost functions, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single
rst prize in order to maximize the expected total e¤ort.
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at the same time.8
Ex ante all potential players choose simultaneously whether or not to enter this
contest, and (at the same time) conditional on entry, player i chooses an e¤ort level
xi.9 E¤ort level xi causes player i a disutility of cixi, where ci denotes player is
(constant) marginal cost of e¤ort, which is private information. Parameter ci is also
called the ability parameter of player i, a low ci indicating a high ability and vice
versa. Ability parameters are drawn independently of each other on the interval
[s; s] (where s > s > 0) according to a distribution function F that is common
knowledge. We assume that F has a continuous density function f = dF=dc > 0.
Each player maximizes expected utility given the values of the prize and the
punishment. We assume that if a potential contestant chooses not to enter the
contest, he receives an outside option of 0. Thus, for each player, the participation
constraint requires his (ex ante) expected utility to be non-negative. The contest
designer determines the size of the punishment in order to maximize the expected
value of the sum of the e¤orts (i.e.,
Pk
i=1 xi) or the expected value of the highest
individual e¤ort.10
2.1 The Objective Function and Entry Decision
Given the commonly known values of V and P , a participant (who chooses to enter
the contest) with ability parameter c, solves the following problem by choosing e¤ort
8If more than one player exerts the highest (lowest) e¤ort, the prize (punishment) is randomly
allocated among them. In the equilibrium we study this happens with zero probability.
9Take an essay contest for example: students have to submit their essays by the deadline, so
they do not know the number of participants until after the deadline.
10We assume that the contest designer only focuses on e¤ort levels and does not get any material
benet or cost directly from the prize or the punishment. The value of the punishment thus cannot
be used to nance the prize.
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level x:
Max
x
fV  Pr(x is the highest)  P  Pr(x is the lowest)  cxg:
We look for an equilibrium such that players with c 2 [s; e) participate in the
contest and every player exerts e¤ort according to a strictly decreasing di¤erentiable
equilibrium e¤ort function x = b(c) when c 2 [s; e). Players with c 2 [e; s] do not
participate in the contest.
A player with c = e is indi¤erent between participating in the contest or not;
we refer to such a player as the marginal player. If he enters he will exert zero
e¤ort, b(e) = 0. This follows as the marginal player has the lowest e¤ort of any
entrant: in equilibrium he will lose against all other entrants with probability one,
so if he was putting in positive e¤ort a deviation to zero e¤ort would be protable.
He anticipates being punished with probability one which is exactly o¤set by the
chance he is the only entrant, in which case he would win the prize. So the marginal
players expected utility is:
V  Pr(e¤ort is the highest)  P  Pr(e¤ort is the lowest)  e 0 = 0,
which implies
F (e) = 1  (P=V ) 1k 1 : (1)
Players with c  e are indi¤erent about entering and setting e = 0; we consider
only equilibria in which they do not enter.11 Equation (1) implies that the larger
P is, the smaller F (e) is, and so the smaller e is, i.e., fewer players would enter the
contest. In particular, if the contest designer sets the punishment to the same value
as the prize, i.e., P = V , then from (1), 1   F (e) = 1 so that F (e) = 0 and e = s.
11Note that if there was a positive measure of zero-e¤ort entrants, increasing e¤ort a tiny amount
would be a protable deviation, so we can rule out symmetric pure-strategy equilibria with higher
cost agents (c > e) also entering.
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Consequently no player will enter.12 Only when P < V do potential entrants exist
and exert positive e¤ort.
If a players ability parameter is c, the probability of another players ability
parameter being smaller than c is F (c). Moreover by the fact that entrantse¤ort
is strictly decreasing in c, a participant who makes an e¤ort x in equilibrium has
ability c = b 1(x). Then, given the equilibrium behavior of other competitors, a
player who enters the contest solves the following problem:13
Max
x
fV  [1  F (b 1(x))]k 1| {z }
Pr(x is the highest)
  P  [F (b 1(x)) + 1  F (e)]k 1| {z }
Pr(x is the lowest)
 cxg (2)
where [1 F (b 1(x))]k 1 is the probability that all other potential players exert less
e¤ort than x and [F (b 1(x))+(1 F (e))]k 1 is the probability that all other players
either exert more e¤ort than x or do not participate in the contest.14
2.2 The Equilibrium
Proposition 1 In a symmetric equilibrium with prize V and punishment P where
0  P  V , players with c 2 [e; s] do not participate in the contest, while players
with c 2 [s; e) participate in the contest and exert e¤ort according to the following
strictly decreasing equilibrium e¤ort function:
b(c) = (k   1)
Z e
c
1
t
fV [1  F (t)]k 2 + P [F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2gf(t)dt; (3)
where e satises (1):
12This is intuitive, since otherwise with the value of the punishment being equal to the value of
the prize, by collecting the punishment from the bottom participant and awarding it to the top
participant, the contest designer could get a positive total e¤ort for no cost.
13Note that the objective function (2) is relevant only for types c < e, i.e., the players who
actually participate in the contest.
14In equilibrium, for player i, Pr(xi is the lowest) equals the probability that every other players
type resides on the interval [s; ci) [ [e; s], i.e., every other player either participates in the contest
with an e¤ort higher than xi, or does not participate in the contest.
10
Proof. See Appendix.
From (3), we can get
b0(c) =  (k   1)f(c)
c
fV [1  F (c)]k 2 + P [F (c) + 1  F (e)]k 2g: (4)
As V; P > 0 and b0(c) < 0, the equilibrium e¤ort function is strictly decreasing in c,
i.e., the more able a participant is, the higher the e¤ort he exerts in equilibrium.15
2.3 Introducing a Small Punishment
With zero punishment, e = s and F (e) = F (s) = 1, so by (4) we obtain
b0(c)jP=0 =  (k   1)f(c)
c
V [1  F (c)]k 2: (5)
When a punishment P > 0 is introduced, we can write (4) as
b0(c)jP>0 = b0(c)jP=0 (k   1)f(c)
c
P [F (c) + 1  F (e)]k 2| {z }
<0
: (6)
Thus for every c 2 [s; e),
b0(c)jP>0 < b0(c)jP=0: (7)
We can interpret the slope of b(c) as the degree of relative competition between
participants, so this shows that a positive punishment leads to more intense relative
competition. This is what we referred to as an incentive e¤ect in the introduction.
However, it does not follow that participants will exert more e¤ort than before.
Marginal participants, that is with abilities close to e, will exert less e¤ort, and
15From (4), it also follows that a consolation prize (a negative punishment, P < 0) for the
bottom player will never be optimal as everyone exerts less e¤ort compared to the case with P = 0
(e = s for P  0, so there is no gain from increased participation). To the extent they exist in the
real world, it could be argued that there may be a psychic loss for the bottom participant from
being revealed as the loser; therefore, a consolation prize to cancel out this punishmentwould
be optimal whenever P = 0 is optimal in the corresponding model with zero psychic costs.
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it may even be that all players exert less e¤ort because fewer players participate.
The following proposition summarizes the relative competition e¤ect, and conditions
under which some players exert more e¤ort and those under which all players exert
less e¤ort.
Proposition 2 (a) The equilibrium e¤ort function b(c) becomes steeper as P in-
creases, that is, b0(c)jP1 < b0(c)jP2 for P1 > P2 and every c such that b(c)jP1 > 0.
(b) The two equilibrium e¤ort functions b(c)jP>0 and b(c)jP=0 either cross once
or do not cross at all. For P su¢ ciently small they will cross once, while for P
su¢ ciently large they do not cross. When they cross once, say at point c = c,
b(c)jP>0 > b(c)jP=0 for every c 2 [s; c) and b(c)jP>0 < b(c)jP=0 for every c 2 (c;
s). When they do not cross, b(c)jP>0 < b(c)jP=0 for every c 2 [s; s).
Proof. See Appendix.
In the proof of (b) it is shown that if the contest designer introduces a (suf-
ciently) small punishment into an open contest, players with the highest ability
(lowest values of c) will increase their e¤ort. Because it is always the case that some
low ability (high c) players drop out when P > 0 and the e¤ort function is steeper
when positive, this means the e¤ort functions must cross once. This is illustrated
in Figure 1 (where b1(c) corresponds to P = 0 and b2(c) to some small P > 0). The
players with c 2 [s; c); whom we call the high ability players, will exert more e¤ort;
the players with c 2 (c; e]; whom we call the medium ability players, will exert less
e¤ort; and the players with c 2 [e; s] whom we call the low ability players, will drop
out.
However, when the punishment is (su¢ ciently) large, as in Figure 2 (where b1(c)
corresponds to P = 0, and b2(c) now to some large P > 0), all participants will exert
12
less e¤ort than before since too many players drop out, i.e., b(c)jP>0 < b(c)jP=0 for
all potential values of c.
 b(c)
)(2 cb
)(1 cb
S     c*                                                              e S c
Figure 1 E¤ort functions when a small punishment is
introduced
  b(c)
)(2 cb
)(1 cb
S                                  e S c
Figure 2 E¤ort functions when a large punishment is
introduced
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This characterization leaves open the question of whether a positive punishment
is desirable. Even though the e¤ort of the most able unambiguously rises with the
introduction of a relatively small P , it does not follow that the expected highest
e¤ort rises since the most able may not be present in a given population of players.
Moreover if the contest designer is interested in the sum of e¤orts, even if the most
able are present, the fact that when P > 0 others reduce their e¤ort or do not
participate, implies that a positive punishment is even less likely to be desirable.16
We now turn to analyze this question in more detail.
3 Maximizing Expected Total E¤ort
In this section, it is assumed that the contest designers aim is to maximize the
expected total e¤ort. For example a university wants to set an essay contest in
some specic eld to improve the overall academic level of all students in that eld.
It wants all the students to contribute as much as possible, i.e., it wants to maximize
the expected total e¤ort.
In equilibrium, the expected average e¤ort (AE) of each potential player is
given by
AE :=
Z s
s
b(c)f(c)dc: (8)
We have shown that there is an equilibrium e¤ort function x = b(c) which is strictly
decreasing for participants with c 2 [s; e), and b(c) = 0 for all players with c  e.
There are k potential players, so from (3) the expected total e¤ort (TE) is
TE := k  AE =
Z s
s
b(c)f(c)dc = k(k   1)R1; (9)
16Although either way it is clear that a large punishment is never optimal.
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where
R1 =
Z e
s
Z e
c
1
t
fV [1  F (t)]k 2 + P [F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2gf(t)dtf(c)dc: (10)
Maximizing TE is equivalent to maximizing R1. In the appendix, we prove the
following result by analyzing (10):
Proposition 3 In an open contest with k  3 players, if the density function f(c)
is non-decreasing in c on the interval [s; s], in order to maximize expected total e¤ort
it is optimal to set P = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that a non-decreasing density constitutes a su¢ cient condi-
tion for optimal punishment being zero.17 This is not a necessary condition, however,
and the optimal punishment can be zero with a decreasing density distributions.
When f(c) is non-decreasing (i.e., increasing or staying constant) with c, the
contest designer anticipates relatively few high ability players. Then, adding even
a small punishment, which will exert the low ability players drop out and medium
players exert less e¤ort, will decrease the expected total e¤ort.
When f(c) is decreasing with c, to maximize expected total e¤ort, the optimal
punishment may still be zero (see Example 1) or strictly positive (see Example 2).
A decreasing density function implies that the contest designer expects there to be
a relatively large number of high ability players. Since their e¤ort levels respond
positively to a small punishment, in order to maximize total e¤ort punishment may
be desirable.
17In this section, we focus on monotone density functions. We do not have general results with
non-monotone density functions.
15
Figure 1: Figure 3 Density Functions in Example 1 [LEFT] and Example 2 [RIGHT].
Example 1 Let V = 1, k = 3, s = 1, s = 11. and consider the (linear) density
function f1(c) = (31   c)=250, which is strictly decreasing in c on [1; 11]. In this
case e = 31  10
p
4 + 5P 1=2. It can be shown that dTE=dP < 0 for any P 2 [0; 1),
and the optimal punishment is zero.
Example 2 Let V = 1, k = 3, s = 1, s = 11 and consider the (linear) density
function f2(c) = (11  c)=50, which is also strictly decreasing with c on the interval
[1; 11]. In this case e = 11  10P 1=4, and TE is maximized when P  0:011. Thus,
the optimal punishment is strictly positive.
Note that in Example 2 (RIGHT in Figure 3) f2(c) is decreasing in c at a faster
rate compared to f1(c) in Example 1 (LEFT in Figure 3), which is consistent with
the intuition given above.18
18Examples 1 and 2 can be established analytically. In general with k = 3 and support [1; 11];
and assuming the density function is linear with a slope a (so that a 2 [ 0:02; 0:02] which ensures
that the density function is always strictly positive on the interior of the support [1; 11]), and grid
step of 0:001, numerical simulations show that, the optimal punishment P  > 0 when  0:020 
a   0:006 and P  = 0 when  0:005  a  0:020. Examples 1 and 2 are then two special cases
of those simulations with a =  0:004 and a =  0:02 respectively.
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3.1 Relationship to Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010)
Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010) analyze a similar situation to the above.19 They
prove that to maximize expected total e¤ort the optimal punishment is always
strictly positive. This seems to contradict our above result that when f(c) is non-
decreasing in c, the optimal punishment is zero, and even when f(c) is decreasing
in c, the optimal punishment may still be zero (see Example 1). As discussed in
the introduction, however, translated into our model they assume that the density
function for c must be positive everywhere on the interval [1;+1):
If we let the support of F be [1;+1) instead of [s; s], our model would be the
same as that in Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010), and we get the following:
Case 1 (Proposition 7 of Moldovanu, Sela and Shi, 2010) When the support of F
is [1;+1),
dTE
dP
jP=0 = k(k   1)
Z +1
1
1
t
[F (t)]k 1dF (t) > 0:
Therefore the optimal punishment is strictly positive.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the support of F is [1;+1) then this excludes the possibility that the Propo-
sition 3 condition holds that f(c) should be non-decreasing with c on the support
since f(c) must be decreasing as c ! +1 given R +1
1
f(c)dc = 1; consequently the
two results are not in fact in conict.
To get some rough intuition, consider starting with a nite support for F , and
suppose a small punishment eP is introduced. By (1), this xes F (e) and hence
e. As argued above, the e¤ect of introducing eP is that this increases the e¤ort
19See section 4.2 of their paper.
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levels of the most able while reducing e¤ort levels of those with costs close to (but
below) e. Moreover all players with costs above e drop out. As we have seen, the
benet of introducing eP may be positive or negative depending on F . Suppose now
that we change F by increasing its support (letting s increase) and stretchingthe
distribution across this wider support, but leaving F unchanged for c  e. Clearly,
the equilibrium of the game with punishment eP is unchanged as exactly the same
players participate as before (e is unchanged). However the benet of introducingeP is di¤erent now: when P = 0 the players with c > e are likely to exert very low
levels of e¤ort as they mostly have high values for c. Moreover even the players
with c close to e will have very low levels of e¤ort because there is e¤ectively no
competition from players with lower ability (see (3)). So when eP is introduced,
not only is the cost of players with c > e dropping out very small, but also the
drop in e¤ort made by those close to e is also small. E¤ectively what we called the
selection e¤ect becomes insignicant, and the incentive e¤ect of the punishment on
the higher ability players dominates for a su¢ ciently stretched support. The benet
of introducing eP will thus become positive.
In other words, c being distributed on [1;+1) with f(c) > 0 implies, from the
contest designers point of view, the weakest (possible) players are always a group
of extremely low ability players (with c = 1=a ! +1 as a ! 0), so starting from
a situation without punishment, introducing a small punishment will make these
extremely low ability players drop out and the high ability players exert more e¤ort.
Because those players with extremely low abilities exert little (almost zero) e¤ort in
the situation without punishment, the selection e¤ect is dominated by the incentive
e¤ect. Therefore, the expected total e¤ort increases after the introduction of an
appropriately small punishment.
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4 Maximizing Expected Highest Individual E¤ort
Instead of maximizing expected total e¤ort, in this section, we focus on the case
where the contest designer wants to elicit the highest individual e¤ort. As we men-
tioned in the introduction, in many contexts, such as research contests and contests
among creative endeavors, the contest designer may only care about the best sub-
mission from among all contestants, i.e., she seeks to maximize the expected highest
individual e¤ort. Or in our previous example, assume now the university only needs
the best essay from its students, with all essays of a lesser quality than the best
being of no interest. Even though we have seen that a positive punishment will raise
the e¤ort of the highest ability players, this does not mean that the expected highest
e¤ort will increase as it may be that all k players have abilities below the critical
level above which e¤ort increases (i.e., with c above c as dened in Proposition
2). Nevertheless given that it only the highest e¤ort level that matters, we will nd
that there are more circumstances under which a positive punishment is called for
compared to the previous case.20
Rank the playersability parameters as follows: c1 < c2 < ::: < ck, so c1 is the
most able player. First consider G1(c), dened as the distribution function of c1.
The probability that all potential players are less able than type c, is (1   F (c))k,
then the probability that at least one player is more able than c is 1  (1  F (c))k.
Therefore,
G1(c) := Pr(c1 < c) = 1  (1  F (c))k.
20For a given P; the punishment is ex post benecial if the most able player, type c1, is more
able than type c, i.e., c1 < c. This is more likely to occur than the total e¤ort being ex post
higher (it follows from Proposition 2 that c1 < c is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for the
total to be higher). This suggest that the ex ante comparison will go the same way.
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Hence, the probability density function of c1 is
g1(c) = G
0
1(c) = k(1  F (c))k 1f(c).
Therefore, the expected highest individual e¤ort can be expressed as
E[b(c1)] =
Z s
s
g1(c)b(c)dc = k(k   1)R2;
where
R2 :=
Z e
s
Z e
c
1
t
fV [1  F (t)]k 2 + P [F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2gf(t)dt(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dc:
(11)
Proposition 4 In an open contest with k  3 players, given a distribution function
F; there exists a number k such that for any number of players k > k, the optimal
punishment is always strictly positive when the contest designers aim is to maximize
the expected highest individual e¤ort.
Proof. See Appendix.
In Proposition 4, a su¢ ciently large k ensures that the optimal punishment is
strictly positive. Intuitively, when the number of potential players is su¢ ciently
large, the chance of the top player being a high ability player will be close to one,
in which case a strictly positive punishment is optimal.
Allowing the density function f(c) to take any form, the proposition gives a
relatively strong condition on the number of potential players (k > k) to guarantee
a positive optimal punishment. For specic forms of f(c), k need not be large, and
may not bind at all. For example:
Case 2 In an open contest where abilities are drawn from a uniform distribution on
[s; s], i.e., f(c) = 1=(s s), and when s=s  1:47; then for any k  3 it is optimal to
set a strictly positive punishment to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The requirement that the most able player is at least 1:47 times as e¢ cient as
the least possible able player seems to be fairly mild for practical applications.21
Thus, when abilities are drawn from a uniform distribution and s=s  1:47, to
maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort the optimal punishment is strictly
positive, while by Proposition 3, to maximize expected total e¤ort the optimal
punishment is zero.
5 Strictly Convex Costs
So far we assumed a linear cost function. In this section, we look at the case with
a strictly convex cost function.22 This is arguably a more realistic assumption.23
We look at the same model described in Section 2 with the only di¤erence that we
assume now that an e¤ort x will cause a player with ability c a disutility of c(x).
Assume (0) = 0, 0 > 0 and 00 > 0, so the cost function c(x) is convex. Let g
be the inverse function of , i.e., g :=  1, then it is straightforward to show that
g0 > 0 and g00 < 0. The following can be obtained by a simple transformation of the
equilibrium strategies we found in the linear case.
Proposition 5 In a symmetric equilibrium with prize V and punishment P where
0  P  V , players with c 2 [e; s] do not participate in the contest, while players
with c 2 [s; e) participate in the contest and exert e¤ort according to the following
21When s=s < 1:47, the optimal punishment can be zero or positive depending on k.
22Henceforth we call this the convex case, and similarly we call the case with a linear cost function
the linear case.
23Though Moldovanu and Sela (2001) consider linear, concave and convex cost functions, they
argue that the convex case is the most applicable.
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strictly decreasing equilibrium e¤ort function:
B(c) = g[b(c)], (12)
where e satises (1) and b(c) is the equilibrium e¤ort function in the linear case,
which is dened by (3).
Proof. See Appendix.
Given g0 > 0; equation (12) implies that our previous results (in Proposition
2 (b)) on the ranking of e¤ort functions as P changes still hold. In particular,
B(c)jP>0 >;=; < B(c)jP=0 when b(c)jP>0 >;=; < b(c)jP=0.
Let TEX denote the expected total e¤ort in the convex case (where the super-
script X refers to the case with convex cost functions). Thus,
TEX = k
Z e
s
g(b(c))f(c)dc: (13)
From (13),
dTEX
dP
= k
Z e
s
g0
db(c)
dP
f(c)dc: (14)
By Proposition 2, there are two possible cases regarding the sign of of db(c)
dP
:
either db(c)
dP
< 0 for all c or there exists a c, s < c < e, such that db(c)
dP
> 0 for small
c (c < c) and db(c)
dP
< 0 for large c (e > c > c). In the former case, dTE
X
dP
dened
by (14) will be negative as g0 > 0. In the latter case, g00 < 0 and b (c) decreasing
imply that the negative terms of db(c)
dP
in the integral dening dTE
X
dP
are multiplied by
higher values of g0 than the positive terms. Thus, other parameters held constant,
dTEX
dP
is negative if dTE
dP
(in the linear case) is negative, and dTE
X
dP
will be negative
for some parameters even when dTE
dP
is positive. Thus Proposition 3 extends to the
convex case, as asserted in Propositon 6 (i) below. However, since convexity of the
cost function enlarges the set of parameters for which dTE
X
dP
is negative when dTE
dP
is
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positive, it will be optimal to set P = 0 in more situations. Indeed, for  su¢ ciently
convex (e.g., take  (x) = x;  > 1; and let  ! 1), the weight placed on (the
negative value of) db(c)
dP
in a neighbourhood of c = e, relative to lower values of c,
becomes arbitrarily large, and part (ii) of the proposition follows straightforwardly.
Likewise as  () becomes more convex, i.e., if a strictly convex transformation
is taken of , then again dTE
X
dP
will be negative for a wider constellation of parame-
ters in the more convex case.24 Finally, by the same logic, starting from a strictly
positive optimal punishment, so dTE
X
dP
= 0 at some P > 0, when the cost functions
become more convex, ceteris paribus, dTE
X
dP
will become negative and so the optimal
punishment will decrease, which justies part (iii) of the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (i) In an open contest with k  3 players and strictly convex cost
functions, if the density function f(c) is non-decreasing in c on the interval [s; s],
it is optimal to set P = 0 in order to maximize expected total e¤ort; (ii) For a given
f (), su¢ cient convexity of the cost function implies that it is optimal to set P = 0;
(iii) Starting from a situation where the optimal punishment is strictly positive, when
the cost functions become more convex (ceteris paribus), the optimal punishment will
decrease.
Roughly speaking, with convex cost functions, it becomes increasingly costly for
a player to exert additional e¤ort. Since, in equilibrium, a more able player exerts
more e¤ort than a less able player, the more able player is more discouraged by the
increasing marginal cost of exerting e¤ort. As P is increased, the extra e¤ort exerted
by higher ability players the only ones who increase e¤ort is reduced relative to
the reduced e¤ort of the lower ability players. Consequently when cost functions
24From equation (20) in the Appendix, db(c)dP is decreasing in c, so that as costs become more
convex an increasingly higher weight is placed on the more negative terms.
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become more convex, total e¤ort is more likely to fall when a punishment is either
introduced or increased.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have studied a contest with a xed prize where potential players can freely choose
whether or not to enter. The contest designer can punish the bottom participant
and we focused on the optimal punishment for maximizing either the expected to-
tal e¤ort or the expected highest individual e¤ort. By introducing a (su¢ ciently)
small punishment, some low ability players drop out, medium ability players exert
less e¤ort and the highest ability players exert more e¤ort. When the punishment
is large enough, low ability players drop out and all participants exert less e¤ort
than without punishment. We further show that in order to maximize the expected
total e¤ort, punishment is guaranteed to be undesirable when the density function
for the e¤ort cost is nondecreasing the contest designer expects there to be rela-
tively few high ability players; on the other hand, to maximize the expected highest
individual e¤ort, punishment is considerably more likely to be desirable. In some
circumstances there is a trade-o¤ between maximizing the expected total e¤ort and
maximizing the expected highest individual e¤ort. In addition, as cost functions
become more convex, punishment becomes less desirable. Hence, depending on the
objectives of the contest designer, the distribution of abilities and the convexity of
costs, punishment may be part of the (optimal) answer.
In our model the prize is exogenously xed, and we focussed on nding the
optimal amount of punishment. It is however straightforward to see that if the
exogenous prize becomes larger (smaller), the corresponding optimal punishment
should be increased (decreased) by precisely the same proportion. When both the
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prize and punishment are endogenously set, and increasing the prize is costly for
the contest designer,25 then the optimal prize (and corresponding punishment) will
depend on the cost function of increasing the prize. This is beyond the scope of this
paper and is left for future research.
We have maintained the assumption that the outside options of potential con-
testants are zero, so that there is no cost to staying out of the contest. However,
it may not unreasonable to suppose that contestants have negative outside options.
For instance, if an economics department increases its failure rate, students may
have to su¤er a cost in switching to a di¤erent course. This would allow a positive
punishment to be introduced at no cost in terms of participation. Our model can
be extended in a straightforward fashion to encompass such cases.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To maximize (2), the rst-order condition is:
 (k 1)f(b 1(x))db
 1(x)
dx
fV [1 F (b 1(x))]k 2+P [F (b 1(x))+1 F (e)]k 2g c = 0.
Rearranging:
1 =  1
c
(k 1)f(b 1(x))db
 1(x)
dx
fV [1 F (b 1(x))]k 2+P [F (b 1(x))+1 F (e)]k 2g.
(15)
Let y denote b 1(x). As in equilibrium b(c) = x, c = b 1(x) = y. Then (15)
can be written as
1 =  1
y
(k   1)f(y)y0fV [1  F (y)]k 2 + P [F (y)) + 1  F (e)]k 2g: (16)
25This must be the case, otherwise the contest designer will want to set an innite prize.
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The marginal player with ability c = e makes zero e¤ort in equilibrium, this gives
the boundary condition y(0) = e. The solution to the di¤erential equation with the
boundary condition is given by:
R 0
x
dt =  G(y) where
G(y) =
Z e
y
1
t
(k   1)f(t)fV [1  F (t)]k 2 + P [F (t)) + 1  F (e)]k 2gdt: (17)
Then we obtain that x = G(y) = G(b 1(x)), therefore, b  G, thus the e¤ort
function of every participant (who enters the contest actively) is given by
b(c) = (k   1)
Z e
c
1
t
fV [1  F (t)]k 2 + P [F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2gf(t)dt:
Thus,
b0(c) =  (k   1)1
c
fV [1  F (c)]k 2 + P [F (c) + 1  F (e)]k 2gf(c) < 0;
i.e., b(c) is strictly decreasing and di¤erentiable for c 2 [s; e), as we assumed initially.
Assuming other players with c 2 [s; e) exert e¤ort according to b(c), we need to show
that for any type c, the e¤ort b(c) maximizes the expected utility of that type. The
necessary rst order condition is satised by construction of b(c). Let
(x; c) := V [1  F (b 1(x))]k 1   P [F (b 1(x)) + 1  F (e)]k 1   cx
be the expected utility of player i with type c that makes an e¤ort x. We will show
that the derivative x(x; c) is nonnegative if x is smaller than b(c) and nonpositive
if x is larger than b(c). As (x; c) is continuous in x, this implies that (x; c) is
maximized at x = b(c). Let x < b(c), and let bc be the type who is supposed to bid
x, that is b(bc) = x < b(c): Note that bc > c because b is strictly decreasing. Thus,
by xc(x; c) =  1 < 0, we obtain x(x; c)  x(x;bc). Since x = b(bc); x(x;bc) = 0
by the rst-order condition, and therefore x(x; c)  0 for every x < b(c). A similar
argument shows that x(x; c)  0 for every x > b(c).
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7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
From (4), we derive
jb0(c)j = (k   1)f(c)
c
fV [1  F (c)]k 2 + P [F (c) + 1  F (e)]k 2g:
Recall that when P increases, e decreases, so F (e) decreases and P [F (c)+1 F (e)]k 2
increases. Thus jb0(c)j gets larger as P increases and claim (a) follows. Hence b(c)jP>0
is steeper than b(c)jP=0. Thus, If b(c)jP>0 and b(c)jP=0 cross, they cannot cross more
than once because b(c)jP>0 is always steeper than b(c)jP=0. Suppose they cross at
point c = c; clearly b(c)jP>0 > b(c)jP=0 for c < c and b(c)jP>0 < b(c)jP=0 for c > c.
If they do not cross, b(c)jP>0 < b(c)jP=0 for all c.
Next, we prove that when the punishment is su¢ ciently small, b(c)jP>0 and
b(c)jP=0 will cross, or equivalently, that when the punishment is very small, b(s)jP>0 >
b(s)jP=0 (as b(c)jP>0 = 0 at c = e < s). From (3):
db(c)
dP
= (k   1)f( de
dP
)
1
e
(V [1  F (e)]k 2 + P )f(e)
+
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2f(t)dt
+ P (k   2)( f(e)) de
dP
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 3f(t)dtg:
From (1);
P = (1  F (e))k 1V; (18)
so that
de
dP
=
 1
(k   1)f(e)(1  F (e))k 2V : (19)
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Substituting (18) and (19) into the above equation:
db(c)
dP
= (k   1)f  1
(k   1)e(2  F (e))
+
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2f(t)dt
+
(k   2)
(k   1)(1  F (e))
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 3f(t)dtg: (20)
Let P = 0 and c = s; P = 0 implies e = s so that F (e) = F (s) = 1; thus
db(s)
dP
jP=0 = (k   1)f
Z s
s
1
t
F (t)k 2f(t)dt  1
(k   1)sg
= (k   1)f
Z s
s
1
t
F (t)k 2f(t)dt 
Z s
s
1
s
F (t)k 2f(t)dtg
= (k   1)f
Z s
s
(
1
t
  1
s
)F (t)k 2f(t)dtg > 0:
Thus when a su¢ ciently small punishment is introduced, b(s)jP>0 > b(s)jP=0 will
hold and it follows that b(c)jP>0 and b(c)jP=0 cross once.
When P ! V , recall from (1) that e! s, so b(s)jP>0 ! 0 and consequently for
large enough P we have b(s)jP>0 < b(s)jP=0 and b(c)jP>0 and b(c)jP=0 do not cross.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that
R1 =
Z e
s
Z e
c
1
t
fV [1  F (t)]k 2 + P [F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2gf(t)dtf(c)| {z }
Z
dc:
Di¤erentiating:
dZ
dP
=
de
dP
(
1
e
)[V (1  F (e))k 2 + P ]f(e)f(c)
+
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2f(t)dtf(c)
  (k   2)f(e) de
dP
P
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 3f(t)dtf(c):
28
Thus,
dR1
dP
=
de
dP
 Zjc=e +
Z e
s
dZ
dP
dc =
Z e
s
dZ
dP
dc:
That is:
dR1
dP
=
de
dP
(
1
e
)[V (1  F (e))k 2 + P ]f(e)
Z e
s
f(c)dc| {z }
()
+
Z e
s
f
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2f(t)dtgf(c)dc| {z }
()
 (k   2) de
dP
f(e)P
Z e
s
f
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 3f(t)dtgf(c)dc| {z }
()
: (21)
Our aim is to prove that when f(x) is non-decreasing in x,
dR1
dP
< 0 for 0  P < V ,
and thus the optimal punishment is zero. Substituting (18) and (19) into (), we
get
() =   1
(k   1)e [2  F (e)]F (e): (22)
In (), reversing the order of integration we can write
() =
Z e
s
Z t
s
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2f(t)f(c)dcdt
=
Z e
s
F (t)
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2f(t)dt: (23)
By assumption f 0(t)  0. Let g(t) := F (t)=t, h(t) := tf(t)   F (t); so that
h0(t) = tf 0(t)  0; thus h(t) > 0 as h(s) = sf(s) > 0: Consequently g0(t) =
(tf(t)  F (t)) =t2 = h(t)=t2 > 0. Hence for all t < e, F (t) =t < F (e)=e. Substitut-
ing into (23):
() =
Z e
s
F (t)
t
[F (t) + (1  F (e))]k 2f(t)dt
<
Z e
s
F (e)
e
[F (t) + (1  F (e))]k 2f(t)dt
=
F (e)
e(k   1)[1  (1  F (e))
k 1]  F (e)
e(k   1) . (24)
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By a similar argument,Z e
s
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + (1  F (e))]k 3f(t)f(c)dtdc < F (e)
e(k   2) . (25)
Substituting (18), (19) and (25) into (), we derive
()  F (e)(1  F (e))
(k   1)e (26)
(equality occurs when P = 0). From (22), (24) and (26), we obtain
dR1
dP
= () + () + () <  (2  F (e))F (e)
(k   1)e +
F (e)
(k   1)e +
F (e)(1  F (e))
(k   1)e = 0:
Therefore, dR1=dP < 0 for all P 2 [0; V ).
7.3.1 Proof of Claim in Case 1:
Substituting (22) and (23) into (21), and noting from substituting (18) and (19) into
(21) that () = 0 at P = 0,
dR1
dP
jP=0 =   1
(k   1)s +
Z s
s
1
t
[F (t)]k 1f(t)dt:
For s = +1 the rst term on the R.H.S. is zero, and so dR1=dP jP=0 > 0:
7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that
R2 =
Z e
s
Z e
c
V
t
([1  F (t)]k 2 + P [F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2)f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dt| {z }
X
dc.
We get
dX
dP
=
de
dP
(
V
e
)[(1  F (e))k 2 + P ]f(e)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)
+
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dt
+ (  de
dP
)P (k   2)f(e)
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 3f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dt:
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Consequently,
dR2
dP
=
de
dP
Xjc=e +
Z e
s
dX
dP
dc =
Z e
s
dX
dP
dc
=
de
dP
(
V
e
)[(1  F (e))k 2 + P ]f(e)
Z e
s
(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dc| {z }
(a)
+
Z e
s
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e))]k 2f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dtdc| {z }
(b)
+ (  de
dP
)P (k   2)f(e)
Z e
s
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 3f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dtdc| {z }
(c)
:
Substituting (18) and (19) into (a) and (c), we get
(a) =   [2  F (e)][1  (1  F (e))
k]
k(k   1)e
(c) =
(k   2)(1  F (e))
(k   1)V
Z e
s
Z e
c
1
t
[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 3f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dtdc:
When P = 0, e = s and F (e) = F (s) = 1, so that (c) = 0; thus
dR2
dP
jP=0 = (a) + (b) > 0
if and only if Z s
s
Z s
c
1
t
F (t)k 2f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dtdc > 1
k(k   1)s: (27)
We can change the order of integration so
LHS of (27) =
Z s
s
Z t
s
[
1
t
F (t)k 2f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dc]dt
=
1
k
Z s
s
1
t
F (t)k 2f(t)[1  (1  F (t))k]dt:
So (27) holds if and only ifZ s
s
1
t
[1  (1  F (t))k]F (t)k 2f(t)dt > 1
s(k   1) : (28)
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We can express 1=(s(k   1)) as
Z s
s
1
s
F (t)k 2f(t)dt: Thus (28) holds if and only if
Z s
s
1
t
[1  (1  F (t))k]F (t)k 2f(t)dt 
Z s
s
1
s
F (t)k 2f(t)dt
=
Z s
s
[(1  t
s
)  (1  F (t))k ]1
t
F (t)k
 2f(t)dt > 0: (29)
Consider the two terms inside the square brackets in (29), (1  t
s
) and (1  F (t))k.
On (s; s),
d(1  F (t))k
dt
=  k(1  F (t))k 1f(t) < 0; (30)
and moreover at t = s;
d(1  F (t))k
dt
=  k(1  F (t))k 1f(t) = 0: (31)
Also y = (1 F (t))k crosses the y and t axes at points (t = s; y = 1) and (t = s; y = 0)
respectively and the linear function y = (1   t
s
) crosses the y and t axes at points
(t = s; y = 1  s
s
) and (t = s; y = 0) respectively. Consider increasing k: the function
y = (1  t
s
) is unchanged but from (30) (1  F (t))k is decreasing in k on (s; s) and
converges to 0 as k ! 1, with the two points (t = s; y = 1) and (t = s; y = 0)
staying xed. Thus for any " > 0 and t > s; there exists a k1 such that for k > k

1,
(1   F (t))k < " and (using (31)) (1   F (t))k < (1   t
s
) on [t; s). Consequently
[(1  t
s
)  (1  F (t))k] < 0 on an arbitrarily small set close to s.
Next consider 1
t
F (t)k 2f(t). Since F (t) increases from 0 to 1 when t increases
from s to s, when k gets larger, 1
t
F (t)k 2f(t) will assign a relatively larger/smaller
weight to [(1   t
s
)   (1   F (t))k] for a large/small t. It is then straightforward to
show that by letting "! 0 and t ! s, the last two facts together imply that there
must exist a k2 such that (29) holds for all k > k

2. This completes the proof.
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7.5 Proof of Case 2
Substituting F (t) =
t  s
s  s and f(t) =
1
s  s into (11), we have:
R2 =
1
(s  s)2k 1
Z e
s
[
Z e
c
V
t
(s  t)k 2 + P
t
(t  s+ s  e)k 2(s  c)k 1dt| {z }]
Y
dc:
It then follows that
dY
dP
=
de
dP
(
V
e
)[(s  e)k 2 + P (s  s)k 2](s  c)k 1
+
Z e
c
1
t
(t+ s  s  e)k 2(s  c)k 1dt
+ (  de
dP
)P (k   2)
Z e
c
1
t
(t+ s  s  e)k 3(s  c)k 1dt:
Hence
dR2
dP
=
1
(s  s)2k 1f
de
dP
Y jc=e +
Z e
s
dY
dP
dcg = 1
(s  s)2k 1
Z e
s
dY
dP
dc
=
1
(s  s)2k 1f
de
dP
(
V
e
)[(s  e)k 2 + P (s  s)k 2]
Z e
s
(s  c)k 1dc| {z }
(a1)
+
Z e
s
Z e
c
1
t
(t+ s  s  e)k 2(s  c)k 1dtdc| {z }
(b1)
+ (  de
dP
)P (k   2)
Z e
s
Z e
c
1
t
(t+ s  s  e)k 3(s  c)k 1dtdc| {z }
(c1)
g:
Using (1) and F (e) =
e  s
s  s ,
P = (
s  e
s  s)
k 1V ; (32)
de
dP
=
 (s  s)k 1
(k   1)(s  e)k 2V : (33)
Substituting (32) and (33) into (a1) and (c1), we have
(a1) =  (s  s)
k 2(2s  s  e)
(k   1)e
Z e
s
(s  c)k 1dc;
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and
(c1) =
(k   2)(s  e)
(k   1)V
Z e
s
Z e
c
1
t
(t+ s  s  e)k 3(s  c)k 1dtdc:
When P = 0, e = s, and
(a1) =  (s  s)
k 1
(k   1)s
Z s
s
(s  c)k 1dc =  (s  s)
2k 1
k(k   1)s ;
(b1) =
Z s
s
Z s
c
1
t
(t  s)k 2(s  c)k 1dtdc;
(c1) = 0
Z s
s
Z s
c
1
t
(t  s)k 3(s  c)k 1dtdc = 0:
Thus we have
dR2
dP
jP=0 = 1
(s  s)2k 1f
Z s
s
Z s
c
1
t
(t  s)k 2(s  c)k 1dtdc  (s  s)
2k 1
k(k   1)s g:
Therefore, dR2=dP jP=0 > 0 if and only ifZ s
s
Z s
c
1
t
(t  s)k 2(s  c)k 1dtdc > (s  s)
2k 1
k(k   1)s : (34)
So the optimal punishment is strictly positive when (34) holds. We can change the
order of integration, so
LHS of (34) =
Z s
s
Z t
s
1
t
(t  s)k 2(s  c)k 1dcdt
=
1
k
Z s
s
1
t
(t  s)k 2[(s  s)k   (s  t)k]dt:
Let v :=
s  t
s  s ; then t = s   (s   s)v, so dt =  (s   s)dv . Since s  t  s, 0 
(s  t) = (s  s)  1; i.e., 0  v  1. Notice that v = 1 when t = s and v = 0 when
t = s. Then we have
LHS of (34) =
1
k
Z s
s
1
t
(t  s)k 2[(s  s)k   (s  t)k]dt
=
(s  s)2k 1
k
Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2(1  vk)
s  v(s  s) dv:
34
We claim that for all k  3, (34) holds ifZ 1
0
(1  v)k 2f (1  v
3)
1  v(1  (s=s))   1gdv > 0: (35)
This is true because
(35)) 1
s
Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2f (1  v
3)
1  v(1  (s=s))   1gdv > 0
)
Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2f (1  v
3)
s  v(s  s)  
1
s
gdv > 0
)
Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2f (1  v
k)
s  v(s  s)  
1
s
gdv > 0 (since k  3)
)
Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2(1  vk)
s  v(s  s) dv >
1
s
Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2dv
)
Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2(1  vk)
s  v(s  s) dv 
1
(k   1)s
) (s  s)
2k 1
k
Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2(1  vk)
s  v(s  s) dv 
(s  s)2k 1
k(k   1)s :
Let
j(v) :=
(1  v3)
1  v(1  (s=s))   1;
then the LHS of (35) becomesZ 1
0
(1  v)k 2j(v)dv. (36)
We can see that the sign of (1   v)k 2j(v) is determined by j(v) as 0  v  1.
Graphically, the value of (36) is equal to the area between the v axis and the curve
(1  v)k 2j(v) on the interval [0; 1]. From the expression for j(v), we can prove that
when 0  v  1,
j(v)
8><>:
>
=
<
9>=>; 0 when v
8><>:
<
=
>
9>=>;p1  (s=s).
As k increases in (36), more relative weight is put on j(v) for lower values of v, and
as j(v) crosses the axis only once (when v =
p
1  (s=s)), a positive integral cannot
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become negative. Therefore, we conclude that if
R 1
0
(1   v)k 2j(v)dvjk=3 > 0, then
for all k  3; R 1
0
(1  v)k 2j(v)dv > 0. We have:Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2j(v)dvjk=3 =
Z 1
0
(1  v)f (1  v
3)
1  [1  (s=s)]v   1gdv
= (1=12)[(s=s)  1] 5f 3 + 28(s=s)  30(s=s)2   6(s=s)3 + 17(s=s)4
 6(s=s)5 + 36(s=s)2 ln(s=s)  36(s=s)3 ln(s=s) + 12(s=s)4 ln(s=s)g:
By analyzing the above equation, it is easy to check that when 0 < (s=s)  0:68,
i.e., when (s=s)  1:47, R 1
0
(1  v)k 2j(v)dvjk=3 > 0. Thus, the optimal punishment
is strictly positive for all k  3.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 5
As now the cost function is c(x) instead of cx, player i0s maximization problem
becomes:
Max
x
fV  [1  F (B 1(x))]k 1| {z }
Pr(x is the highest)
  P  [F (B 1(x)) + 1  F (e)]k 1| {z }
Pr(x is the lowest)
 c(x)g:
Let y be the inverse of B, i.e., y() = B 1(). As B(c) = x, c = B 1(x) = y(x).
Then the FOC can be written as
0(x) =  1
y
(k   1)f(y)y0fV [1  F (y)]k 2 + P [F (y)) + 1  F (e)]k 2g:
Using boundary condition y(e) = 0 and integration, we can derive that (x) = G(y)
where G(y) is dened exactly by (17). Thus, x =  1(G(y)), then B = x =
g(G(y)) = g(b(c)). The equilibrium e¤ort function (12) is strictly decreasing since
for all c 2 [s; e), it can be shown that dg
dc
= g0b0 < 0. For the su¢ cient second-order
condition we proceed exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1.
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